



In this generation the various elements of the legal community
have perceived Henry Friendly as quintessentially the lawyers' lawyer,
the judges' judge, and the scholars' scholar. It is a phenomenon with no
precise counterpart in our national legal history. And it is something
that might not have happened at all, because his brilliant performance
as an undergraduate at Harvard College in historical studies held out
the promise of a great academic career in an area he had found to be
personally very congenial. Fortunately and, so it is said, with some ex-
ternal persuasion brought to bear, his attention was finally and firmly
focused on the law, all to the greater glory of that profession. The story
is that Felix Frankfurter, hoping to save this extraordinary undergrad-
uate for the Harvard Law School, finally persuaded him to try the law
school for just one year, certain that this stratagem would do the
job-as it did.
Although long aware of his legal eminence, I first became person-
ally acquainted with Judge Friendly 'when, still a practicing lawyer in
Chicago, I became a member of the Council of the American Law In-
stitute and attended its biennial meetings in New York City. The func-
tion of that body was to scrutinize carefully the Restatement drafts pre-
pared by the expert Reporters with the help of their respective
Advisory Committees, and to clear them for consideration by the mem-
bers of the Institute as a whole. From the first I was quick to note the
degree to which Judge Friendly had, despite his judicial burdens, done
his homework, and how his participation in the discussions invariably
resulted in clarification and improvement of the texts being examined.
It is a contribution that he continues to make, and the Institute's output
is steadily and surely enriched thereby.
My first opportunity, however, to work with Judge Friendly at
closer range and on a more personal basis came a few years after I had
become a federal court of appeals judge myself. In 1972 I was desig-
nated to serve for a week as a visiting judge on the Second Circuit, and
was especially gratified to find that Judge Friendly would preside over
the panel on which I was to sit. All of my favorable expectations were
more than borne out, and I learned a lot about such things as how to
assure the usefulness of oral argument and formulate the precise ques-
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tions requiring resolution.
That sitting eventuated, however, in what I continue to believe to
be the most challenging opinion-writing assignment I have had in my
judicial life to date. The last case we heard was an appeal from a judg-
ment of the district court granting retroactive monetary damages to
welfare recipients in New York who claimed that they had been paid
less than they were entitled to under the applicable laws and regula-
tions, including those of a federal provenance because of the grants-in-
aid made by Congress for relief assistance, administered by the New
York State welfare agency. It was contended that the suit in truth was
against the state of New York, and therefore one that could not be
pursued in a federal court because the eleventh amendment of the
United States Constitution provides that the federal judicial power does
not extend to suits against a state.
In the conference following oral argument, the vote was to reverse,
but with some uncertainty on all sides as to just how-or whether-the
eleventh amendment operated in this case. I accepted the writing as-
signment, but urged that we continue our conference discussion of the
eleventh amendment because I needed all the help I could get on that
question. Judge Friendly, however, flatteringly but firmly suggested
that the matter be left in my hands without further ado. I recognized
that he was engaging in an old ploy we all use on those occasions when
we want to see how persuasive the opinion is after it is actually written,
at which time an earlier vote of a tentative nature can be reexamined
and perhaps changed.
The result was that I found myself back in Washington devoting
most of the summer to this opinion, Judge Friendly being at the time
on one of the European holidays in which he so delights. The job was
complicated by two facts. First, I had not involved either of my law
clerks in the Second Circuit sitting, since it came at a time when they
were completing their terms, and thus I was entirely on my own. Sec-
ond, there was always pressing in upon me the fact that my son-in-law
was starting his clerkship year with Judge Friendly in September, and
I did not relish the prospect of the Judge's thinking after reading my
proposed opinion that the boy might be all right but his father-in-law
was perhaps in the wrong business.
As it turned out, my anxieties were groundless. My colleagues
concurred in the opinion,1 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Not long thereafter the Seventh Circuit decided the same issue contra-
1 Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921
(1973).
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rily, and explicitly characterized as "unpersuasive" the Second Circuit
opinion. Because of the conflict, the Supreme Court took the Seventh
Circuit case and ultimately reversed it in an opinion adopting our ap-
proach.2 That approach has since been made by the Court a basic prin-
ciple of eleventh amendment law.'
Thus my ordeal not only turned out all right, but fostered a deep-
ening of my personal relationship with Judge Friendly. He gave me a
chance to see what I could do with a tough legal problem, and no jun-
ior judge can be anything but grateful for such treatment by a senior
colleague of established eminence.
My next opportunity to serve on the same court with Judge
Friendly came a few years later, when Congress enacted the Regional
Rail Reorganization Act of 1973.4 That statute had as its objective the
bringing together as a single unit the numerous eastern railroads then
individually in the bankruptcy reorganization courts. The new law cre-
ated a new court-the Special Railroad Court-to handle litigation
arising under it.5 It provided that the three judges of the Special Court
were to be appointed by the Chief Judge of the Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation.
I first heard about the new court when I received a telephone call
from Judge John Wisdom, who headed the multidistrict panel. He said
only that he wished to appoint me, but added in the next breath that I
should not say anything but wait for a telephone call that would be
coming in from Judge Friendly within five minutes.
As I waited for that call I wondered if there might not be some
problems about an active judge, carrying a full share of the load of a
busy court, being able to take on the extra duties of the Special Rail-
road Court. But when Judge Friendly called and urged me to accept
the appointment, I thought that it would do me no good to raise that
question, since Judge Friendly was still an active judge himself. Thus,
I succumbed to his request that I accept the appointment because, as he
put it, he wanted "someone to talk to who knew something about rail-
roads," I having served as general counsel of a railroad as a part of my
law practice in Chicago. A few days later I read in the New York Times
that Judge Friendly had taken senior status-a timing that, because of
his great productive capacities, I had no reason to believe to be related
2 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), rev'g 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
S Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 911 (1984).
' Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 (1973) (codified as amended 45 U.S.C. §§
701-794 (1982)).




to the advent of the Special Railroad Court-as already had Judge
Thomsen of Baltimore, who was the third appointee.
Putting aside for the time being my concern for the problems I
might have because of my own continuing commitment as an active
judge to my own court, I embarked enthusiastically on my duties, espe-
cially since they afforded me a second-and more prolonged-chance to
sit with Judge Friendly. It appeared that the first phase of litigation
under the new act would be principally concerned with the question of
its constitutionality. This proved to be the case, and two years or more
were consumed by consideration of these questions.8 In the event, our
affirmative rulings on constitutionality also prevailed in the Supreme
Court in consolidated appeals coming up to it from the individual reor-
ganization courts.7 For me the most important thing was that I had the
happy and valuable experience of sitting with-and constantly learning
from-Judge Friendly.
The second phase of litigation under the Act had to do mainly
with the very difficult questions inherent in the valuation of railroad
properties and securities." Having no option to take senior status, I re-
signed my post on the Special Railroad Court, but I did follow as an
observer the heroic efforts which Judge Friendly made to illuminate
and to dispose of these questions in an elaborate series of Special Court
opinions issued over several years.
The results speak for themselves in terms of the magnitude of his
accomplishment. The individual bankrupt railroads were brought to-
gether in one unit-Conrail-which has been so surprisingly successful
that the government currently has before it several quite substantial
competing purchase offers by private interests, thereby restoring to the
government some of the public funds expended by it to implement the
statute. I am sure that no judge who sat on the Special Court, and no
lawyer who took part in the litigation, would ever believe that this
could have happened except for Henry Friendly. Among his many con-
spicuously successful judicial achievements, this one will stand out as a
remarkable demonstration of the skill and imagination which he can
bring to bear upon any subject matter, despite its complex and special-
ized nature.
Instructive as they invariably are, it is not by his judicial opinions
6 See, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895 (Regional Rail
Reorg. Ct. 1974).
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
8 See, e.g., In re Valuation Proceedings Under Sections 303(c) and 306 of the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 439 F. Supp. 1351 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct.
1977).
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alone that Judge Friendly has made such a deep imprint upon the law.
He leads a separate life as a creative scholar whose research and writ-
ing have time and again enriched our legal literature and informed our
understanding of important areas of the law. The list of his resulting
publications is as formidable in length as it is impressive in scope.
And it continues to increase. I have at hand a lecture given by him
not long ago at Emory University and published in the Emory Law
Journal. Entitled "Indiscretion About Discretion," it is a fresh and
penetrating analysis of the perennial problem of appellate review of
trial court rulings in areas commonly characterized as discretionary.9 It
is a problem with which judges are constantly confronted, and there are
real dangers of rule by rote displacing careful issue-by-issue analysis.
Judge Friendly's subject in this instance has none of the glamour of
constitutional adjudication, but it ventilates a subject that, however
lacking in drama, is constantly claiming the courts' attention and where
nothing could be more useful than a close look by such a keen observer
as Judge Friendly.
It is understandably easy, but highly mistaken, to allow the image
of Judge Friendly the man of law to overlay too heavily that of Judge
Friendly the man. The truth of that was never made more clear to me
than it was a year ago, when I was again sitting by designation on the
Second Circuit. Judge Friendly was not on the panel with me, but the
chambers I used were directly across the hall from his. One day after
my day's sitting was ended, he kindly suggested that we walk out some-
where for lunch. This resulted in a long and leisurely talk-fest, which I
shall never forget. It ranged widely over many subjects, of which the
law was only one. It revealed to me as never before the dimensions and
diversity of Henry Friendly's intellectual and cultural universe. It is a
world in which any serious inquiry made by him will contribute to
both the pleasure and profit of his fellow citizens. We of the law are
the most numerous-but not the only-beneficiaries of that fact.
Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982).
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